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FINDING A CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE PATH
TO SEX EQUALITY: THE YOUNG WOMEN'S
LEADERSHIP SCHOOL OF EAST HARLEM
Denise C. Morgan *
I feel obliged to open this piece with a small confession. If it were
possible for me to step back in time to 1982, to meet myself at the age of
seventeen, and to tell my seventeen-year-old self that she would grow up
to be something of a champion for single-sex education -- she would
probably have fits. That is because in late January 1982, I was eagerly
(the word will do, although it is probably not quite strong enough to
describe my state of mind at the time) awaiting graduation from Miss
Chapin's School for Girls -- the private all-girls school on the Upper East
Side of Manhattan that I had attended from the age of six. My eagerness
for graduation had nothing to do with feeling stereotyped or limited or
stigmatized by my educational experience: I was on the junior varsity
volleyball team, I had one of the lead roles in the school play, I was taking
BC calculus and had recently fallen in love with both philosophy and
physics. Chapin was a great place, but I wanted out. I wanted to
experience what I thought was "the real world" -- a coeducational college.
Given my eagerness to escape from an all-girls environment to the
larger world of coeducation, I have worried that I am somehow betraying
my seventeen-year-old self in taking the position that not only are some
all-girls schools constitutionally permissible and pedagogically justified,
but that for some girls they are preferable to coeducational schools. But,
I stopped worrying when I realized that at seventeen I was not yet clear
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about what I had gained from attending an all-girls school that I may well
not have gained had I been schooled in a coeducational environment.
Now that I have a fuller picture of the benefits of all-girls schools, rather
than feeling shy about my support for them, I feel that I owe it to girls who
want to attend all-girls public schools, like the Young Women's
Leadership School ("The Leadership School"),' and to communities in
which parents and teachers believe that all-girls public education will
substantially benefit some of their children, as well as to my seventeen-
year-old self, to make clear that there are no constitutional or statutory
impediments to providing the option of all-girls education in a public
school setting.
I do not believe that anyone has a constitutional or statutory right
to public single-sex education.' Nor, do I believe that it would be
desirable or legally permissible to sex segregate the entire public school
system. Aside from being undesirable, the sex segregation of the entire
public school system is also highly improbable given the tremendous cost
of implementing such a plan and the firm entrenchment of the uniquely
American tradition of coeducation.3 My proposition is far more modest:
The Leadership School, which is located on three floors of a commercial building
in District 4 in East Harlem, is the only public all-girls school in New York City. The other
two single-sex kindergarten through twelfth grade public schools in the country - both of
which are all-girls - are located in Baltimore and Philadelphia. The Leadership School
currently serves fifty-five 7th grade students, but will expand to include 8th and 9th grade
students in the 1997-98 academic year. The school will include an additional grade each
year thereafter, and should eventually serve between 300 and 350 students. Interview with
Celenia Chevere, Principal of The Leadership School, in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 25, 1996);
Jacques Steinberg, Just Girls, and That's Fine With Them, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1997, at B 1
[hereinafter Steinberg, Just Girls].
2 One could argue that if, in the absence of single-sex schools, female students
were "effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education" it would violate Title IX for
state officials to fail to offer all-girls public education. Cf. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566
(1974) (failure to provide bilingual education to students who were otherwise "foreclosed
from any meaningful education" violates Title VI). However, it is exceedingly unlikely that
such a claim would be successful.
'See DAVID TYACK & ELISABETH HANSOT, LEARNING TOGETHER: A HISTORY OF
COEDUCATION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 287 (Yale Univ. Press 1990) ("Coeducation
became a defining characteristic of American public schools very early in their history.").
[Vol. XIV
19981 PANEL H 97
it is simply that in communities in which parents and teachers have good
reason to believe that all-girls education will substantially benefit some of
their children, that neither the Constitution nor Title IX is necessarily an
obstacle to their choice of educational strategies.4
I. ALL-GIRLS SCHOOLS, THE ASSUMPTION OF INFERIORITY &
ANTI-SUBORDINATION ANALYSIS
I felt obliged to open with the confession that I made because I
wanted to make clear the starting position from which I evaluate all-girls
education. Unlike many people who assume the inherent inferiority of any
educational setting where there are no boys -- given my educational
background and the fact that my friends and I turned out to be better
prepared for college than most of the women and the men that we met
when we got there -- I cannot accept that assumption.5
I hesitate to draw simple parallels between single-sex and single-
race institutions, but I think the analogy I am about to make is
Moreover, the trend has been towards coeducation: "far fewer single-sex schools now exist
in the public sector than was the case at mid-century; [and] in the private sector, there has
been a pronounced decline in numbers of single-sex institutions." MARY MOORE, U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLING: PERSPECTIVES FROM PRACTICE AND RESEARCH
67(1993).
" The Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment protects academic
freedom. See Keyishan v.Bd. of Educ. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). Accordingly,
here, as in other areas of education law and policy, "Courts should not 'intervene in the
resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operations of school systems' unless 'basic
constitutional values' are 'directly and sharply implicate[d]' in those conflicts." Board of
Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982)(quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968)).
I recognize that in making this statement I run the risk of sounding like Justice
Clarence Thomas, who disregarding this country's history of providing segregated, unequal
and inadequate education to Black children, said: "It never ceases to amaze me that the
courts are so willing to assume that anything that is predominantly black must be inferior."
Missouri v. Jenkins, _ U.S. __, 115 S.Ct. 2038, 2061 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). My
unwillingness to assume the inherent inferiority of all-girls schools is not based on a lack of
appreciation for the subordination of women in U.S. history, but rather is the result of my
belief that all-girls education has been and will continue to be part of the process of redressing
that history.
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appropriate.6 I am no more willing to assume that The Leadership School
offers an inferior or stigmatizing educational experience compared to that
offered in other New York City public schools based solely on the fact that
all of the students are girls, than I am willing to assume that it offers an
inferior or stigmatizing educational experience based solely on the fact that
over seventy-five percent of the children who attend the school are Black
and/or Latina (which is true).7 To make either assumption is, I believe, to
assume the inferiority of the children who are attending the school (based
on their sex or their race, respectively).' That is quite obviously a mistake.
"But," you say, "what about the long history of educational
deprivation that children of color have suffered in the U.S.?"9 "Or, forget
the past -- what about the fact that today children of color in New York
6 In contrast, the analogy between the state mandated system of racial segregation
which precluded choice and the accumulation of social, political and economic capital in all
areas of the lives of people of color, and a family's voluntary choice to send a child to an
educationally beneficial all-girls school is extremely inappropriate. See Michael Meyers,
Schools Dodge the Law, USA TODAY, Oct. 15, 1996, at 14A. The comparison is inapt
because "[i]t is not separation per se that made segregation subordinating; rather this result
is more properly attributable to the fact that it was enforced and supported by state power,
and accompanied by the explicit belief in African-American inferiority." Kimberl6 Williams
Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1378 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw,
Transformation].
' The Leadership School estimates that 40% of its students are Latina, 35% are
African American and 25% are other. Telephone interview with The Leadership School
front office (Jan. 10, 1997).
'See Denise C. Morgan, "hat is Left to Argue in Desegregation Law?: The Right
to Minimally Adequate Education, 8 HARV. BLACK LETTER J. 99, 106 (1991) ("Attending
predominantly Black schools can be harmful to Black children because those schools tend
to be educationally inferior, not because Black children are inferior, or because access to
white children is inherently positive.").
" See generally JAMES ANDERSON, THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS IN THE SOUTH
1860-1935 (1988); LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE METROPOLITAN
EXPERIENCE 1876-1980 115-126 (Harper & Row 1988); RICHARD KLUGER, SINMLE JUSTICE:
THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY (1975). See also L. SCOTT MILLER, AN AMERICAN IMPERATIVE: ACCELERATING
MINORITY EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMNT 118-120 (Yale Univ. Press 1995) (describing the
intergenerational effects of educational deprivation).
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City public schools do not receive their fair share of the State's
educational resources?" 10 "And what about gender bias -- in resources
and attention -- that girls continue to face in the public school system?"
Gender bias is not a subtle thing, it can and does depress the cognitive
development of many female students."' 2 "Surely," you say, "these things
must mean that schools in which the students are predominantly of color
or are all girls are inherently inferior?" No, they do not.
My problem is with the word "inherently." In order to figure out
whether any particular educational experience is inferior or stigmatizing,
we need to examine the context in which it exists. We need to determine
whether the school works, explicitly or implicitly, to maintain the social,
economic, or political dominance of a relatively empowered group over
a relatively subordinated group. I call this doing an anti-subordination
analysis. 3  Underfunded schools for kids of color and all-
10 In 1991, 81% of New York City public school students were children of color,
and New York City students accounted for 74% of New York State's minority public school
population. Therefore, the persistent bias in the State's school financing scheme, which
allocates less State aid per student to New York City students than to students attending
school outside of the City, also allocates less State aid to the education of students of color
than to White students. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 324 (N.Y.
1995).
" Both inside and outside of school settings, our culture "is ambivalent toward
female achievement, proficiency, independence, and right to a full equal life. Our culture
devalues both women and the qualities which it projects onto us, such as nurturance,
cooperation, and intuition. It has taught us to undervalue ourselves." PEGGY ORENSTEIN,
SCHOOL GIRLS, at xix (1994). See generally AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY
WOMEN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS - THE AAUW
REPORT (1992) [hereinafter AAUW REPORT].
'2See infra note 56.
13 Anti-subordination analysis would require proof of the socio-historical meaning
of a challenged practice. Litigants could offer evidence of the intent of the originators and
the proponents of the practice - although intent alone should not be dispositive. Cf. United
States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2290 (1996) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing that only
the State's rationales for maintaining VMII's all-male admissions policy which post-dated
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, not the intent of the founders of the school, should
be considered in determining the legality of the policy). In addition, litigants could offer
expert testimony as to whether the practice has worked to break down or to reinscribe
stereotypes and as to whether the practice has effectively redressed current or past
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girls schools with no math or science offerings would fail an anti-
subordination analysis because such schools would perpetuate historical
race and sex inequalities. Likewise, the single-sex public schools that
were proposed by White parents in an effort to avoid sending their
daughters to desegregated schools with the sons of Black parents would
also fail an anti-subordination analysis because they were designed to
maintain the social, economic and political dominance of White parents
over Black parents by perpetuating the ideology of White supremacy. 4
On the other hand, I can imagine both single-sex and single-race schools
which could pass an anti-subordination analysis. 5
discrimination. As in any case involving expert testimony, the role of the judge should be
to evaluate the reliability of the methodologies of the competing expert witnesses and to
assess their credibility, not simply to substitute his/her understanding of how the challenged
practice works in the world for the understanding of the school district or the legislature.
The principle of anti-subordination has been developed in the work of many
critical race theory scholars and feminist legal theory scholars. See generally Derrick Bell,
Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1985); Ruth Colker, Anti-
Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003 (1986);
Charles R. Lawrence [II, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance:
On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (Harvard Univ. Press 1987); Crenshaw,
Transformation, supra, note 6, at 1331; MARl J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND:
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (Westview Press
1993); Lucinda Finley, Sex-Blind, Separate But Equal, or Anti-Subordination? The Uneasy
Legacy ofPlessy v. Ferguson and Gender Discrimination, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1089 (1996).
"' See United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., 560 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Georgia, 466 F.2d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 1972); Smith v. St. Tammany Parish
Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 106, 108, modified, 316 F. Supp. 1174 (D.C. 1969); Moore v.
Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 304 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. La. 1969). See also Note, The
Constitutionality of Sex-Separation in School Desegregation Plans, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 296
(1970) (citing additional cases); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding 'anti-
miscegenation statutes unconstitutional because they were "designed to maintain White
Supremacy").
"S Of course, the schools would not only have to be equal to other schools in
facilities and resources, but would also have to be equal in terms of intangible factors like
social capital. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Gil Kujovich, Equal Opportunity
in Higher Education and the Black Public College: The Era of Separate But Equal, 72
MINN. L. REV. 29, 158 (1987) (describing the "ambiguous legacy" of the Black public
college as "both a vestige of unconstitutional discrimination and a vestige of self-help and
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Having visited The Leadership School and been sufficiently
impressed by the administration, the facilities, and the curriculum to
believe that the school will help to redress the history of educational
deprivation in the communities served by District 4 (which are 98.2% of
color), 6 and to believe that the school will counter some of the gender bias
in our public school system -- I do not want to make the assumption that
The Leadership School is inferior, or stigmatizing, or that it should be shut
down because it is unconstitutional. Rather, I would like to figure out how
to determine the difference between a legally permissible single-sex
educational environment and a legally impermissible one.
II. ALL-GIRLS SCHOOLS AND TfIE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The day that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Virginia 7 was announced was a glorious one for me. I was on the phone
all day long celebrating with other feminist lawyers around the country.
But, soon thereafter, I started to see editorials bemoaning the death of all
single-sex institutions. The editorials were mostly written by old male
alumni of the Virginia Military Institute ("VMI") or The Citadel who
vowed to protect their schools from the onslaught of women (with
bayonets if need be) -- so I dismissed their comments about the
implications of the Supreme Court's decision as sour grapes. 8 But, then
affirmative action by the black population.").
16 As of October 1995, the racial composition of the 14,521 students enrolled in
District 4 was 60.8% Latino, 36.3% African American, 1.8% White, .8% Asian and .4%
Native American. The racial composition of the 1.5 million children in the New York City
public school system was 37.3% Latino, 36.4% African American, 16.5% White, 9.5% Asian
and .4% Native American. Telephone interview with Marvin Jacobs, Student Information
New York City Board of Education, in New York, N.Y. (Jan. 10, 1997).
17 __ U.S. __, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (1996).
"s See William S. Galvin, At VMI, Much of What Made it Special Is Dying, BUFF.
NEWS, July 22, 1996, at B2 (author was a member of the class of 1957 at Vil); Carol
Simpson, A Black Day for VMI and America, VIRGINIAN-PILoT & LEDGER STAR, July 17,
1996, at A]6 (author's son was a cadet at VMI); First VMI, then..., WASH. TIMES, July 21,
1996, at B2; Michael Prowse, Give Men a Break: Self-righteous American Feminists Are
Waging a Hotv WarAgainst the Beleaguered Male of the Species, FIN. TIMES, July 15, 1996,
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
I heard that the ACLU and NOW -- organizations for which I have
considerable respect -- were applauding the death of all single-sex
institutions in the wake of United States v. Virginia. I became troubled. 9
I ran for my copy of the opinion. Had I missed something? No, on page
2276 of volume 116 of the Supreme Court Reporter, Justice Ginsburg
says:
Sex classifications may be used to
compensate women 'for particular
economic disabilities [they have]
suffered,' to 'promot[e] equal
employment opporturity,' to advance the
full development of the talent and
capacities of our Nation's people. But
such classifications may not be used, as
they once were, to create or perpetuate
the legal, social, and economic inferiority
of women.2"
What a relief Not only were single-sex schools constitutionally
permissible under certain circumstances, but Justice Ginsburg had laid
out a simple two-pronged test for evaluating whether those circumstances
existed. First, the school's educational strategy must be substantially
related to the important government objective of advancing "the full
at A16; George F. Will, Ruling on VMI Endangers All Single-sex Education, SACRAMENTO
BEE, July 5, 1996, at B7; David Reed, i'M! Says Going Private Would "Save the Males",
CHIC. SUN-TnMEs, June 27, 1996, at 3; Donald P. Baker & Ann O'Hanlon, VAII Mourns a
Tradition Lost, WASH. POST, June 27, 1996, at BO. See also 116 S.Ct. at 2306 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("[The majority opinion] ensures that single-sex public education is functionally
dead.").
9 At least I was not alone in my discomfort. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Et Tu,
A.C.L.U.?, N.Y. TIMEs, July 18, 1996, at A23; Stephen Gillers, Girls School in Harlem is
Unlike Virginia Case, N.Y. TIMEs, July 21, 1996, at D14.
20 116 S.Ct. at 2276 (emphasis added).
102 [Vol. XIV
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development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people."'" In
other words, there must be a sufficiently snug fit between the methodology
of the school and its educational mission for the methodology to be
pedagogically justified.22 And second, Justice Ginsburg's test requires us
to examine the context in which the school exists to determine whether it
perpetuates the subordination of women. In other words, the school must
pass an anti-subordination analysis.
Based on the evolution in Justice Ginsburg's understanding of sex
equality which is reflected in her academic writings, I have reason to
believe that she would agree with my interpretation of the United States
v. Virginia opinion. In the early 1970's, the Justice was a proponent of
formal sex equality and argued that whether proffered with protective or
21 116 S.Ct. at 2276.
2 Courts usually give substantial weight to the opinions of professional educators
in evaluating whether particular pedagogical strategies are educationally beneficial. See
Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-26 (1985) ("Considerations of
profound importance counsel restrained judicial review of the substance of academic
decisions .... Added to our concern for lack of standards is a reluctance to trench on the
prerogatives of state and local educational institutions and our responsibility to safeguard
their academic freedom, 'a special concern of the First Amendment'."). See also Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution
of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly
and sharply implicate basic constitutional values."); Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S.
78, 90-91 (1978) ("We decline to further enlarge the judicial presence in the academic
community and thereby risk deterioration of many beneficial aspects of the faculty student
relationship.... By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of
state and local authorities."). However, pedagogical strategies which are the product of
constitutionally impermissible motivation have been subject to close judicial scrutiny. See
Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870-71 (1982) (citing racial animus and political
partisanship as examples of "unconstitutional motivation" for removing books from a school
library). Compare Virgil v. Sch. Bd. of Columbia County, 862 F.2d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir.
1989) (decision was constitutionally permissible because it was "reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns"), with Pratt v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d
771, 776 (8th Cir. 1982) (unconstitutional religious motivation). The Supreme Court
recently expounded on the subject of unconstitutional motivation in Romer v. Evans, __
U.S. __, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996): '[lf the constitutional conception of 'equal
protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare ... desire
to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest'."
(quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
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malicious intent, sex classifications were likely to work to the disadvantage
of women.23 Accordingly, she contended that the Equal Rights
Amendment should be interpreted to "declare sex a prohibited
classification, not merely a suspect one,"24 and that all sex classifications,
except those bearing on personal privacy or physical characteristics unique
to one sex, should be held to violate that Amendment.2 5 In her speeches
and writings during this period Justice Ginsburg frequently invoked the
words of Sarah Grimke: "I ask no favors for my sex. All I ask of our
brethren is that they take their feet off our necks."26
However, towards the end of the 1970's Justice Ginsburg clarified
her position with respect to legislation designed to compensate women for
gender bias:
Realizing the equality principle, however,
will require a persistent effort, after
artificial barriers are removed, to prevent
perpetuation of the effects of past
discrimination long into the future....
Hence the need for affirmative action,
designed not to confer favors but to
assure that women with capacity to do
the job are set on par with men of similar
capacity who, through a discriminatory
system, have been permitted to
23 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Men, Women and the Constitution: Equal Rights
Amendment, 10 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 77, 99 (1973) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Constitution]
(noting that "some aspects of the traditional arrangement disfavor men, and some exact a toll
from both sexes.... Favors rarely come without an accompanying detriment.").
' Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex and Unequal Protection: Men and Women as Victims,
11 J. FAM. L. 347, 361 (1971) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Unequal Protection].
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., id. at 362; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Status of Women, 20 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 585, 589-90 (1972); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Need for the Equal Rights
Amendment, 59 A.B.A. J. 1013, 1017 (1973); Ginsburg, Constitution, supra note 23, at 99.
104 [Vol. XIV
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monopolize the calling.27
Not only did she acknowledge the need for compensatory programs to
redress the history of sex discrimination, Justice Ginsburg also agreed with
the test adopted by the Supreme Court in Califano v. Webster28 for
distinguishing impermissible sex discrimination from permissible
rectification for past injustice. She interpreted that case as providing that
a sex-based classification was compensatory "if [it was] in fact adopted by
the legislature for remedial reasons rather than out of prejudice about 'the
way women are.' Even then, the classification will be upheld only if it
neatly matches the remedial end." Those two requirements, that the sex-
based classification not work to stereotype women and that it be closely
related to compensating women for past injustice are precisely the
elements of the test enunciated in United States v. Virginia. °
So, despite Justice Scalia's railings to the contrary,31 the majority
opinion in United States v. Virginia did not announce a new equal
protection test for sex-based classifications, nor did it endorse an
abandonment of the traditional intermediate scrutiny test. The United
27 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Realizing the Equality Principle, in SOCIAL JUSTICE &
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT: WOMEN AND RACIAL MINORITIES IN EDUCATION AND BUSINESS
135-36 (William T. Blackstone and Robert D. Heslop eds. 1977).
28430 U.S. 313 (1977) ("[We have rejected attempts to justify gender classifications
as compensation for past discrimination against women when the classifications in fact penalized
women wage earners... or when the statutory structure and its legislative history revealed that
the classification was not enacted as compensation for past discrimination.").
29 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution: The State of the Art,
4 WOMEN'S RTS. L. RPTR. 143, 146 (1978) [hereinafter, Ginsburg, Sex Equality].
'0 1 am not as certain that Justice Ginsburg would agree with my application of the
test she developed in United States v. Virginia. In 1977, after an equally divided Supreme
Court affirmed a Third Circuit decision upholding the constitutionality of an all-boys high
school in the face of an Equal Protection Clause challenge, Justice Ginsburg counseled that
the "reservation of any institution to males is 'likely to be a witting or unwitting device for
preserving tacit assumptions of male superiority, assumptions for which women eventually
must pay."' Ginsburg, Sex Equality, supra note 29, at 147. She was, however, silent as to
her opinion about the constitutionality of all-girls schools.
3 116 S. Ct. at 2291 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[The Court] drastically revises our
established standards for reviewing sex-based classifications.").
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States v. Virginia opinion used the traditional statement of the
intermediate scrutiny test 2 interchangeably with a new phrase "skeptical
scrutiny,"33 and a less common -- but not novel -- formulation of the
intermediate scrutiny test which requires that "[plarties who seek to defend
sex-based government action must demonstrate an 'exceedingly
persuasive justification' for that action."34 Perhaps the Court's use of
various formulations of the intermediate scrutiny test was intended to
emphasize the fact that mid-tier scrutiny requires careful judicial
evaluation of the rationales supporting the use of sex-based classifications
or perhaps the Court was simply acknowledging the flexibility of its Equal
Protection analysis.3" In either case, it is apparent that a majority of the
Court was unwilling to make the clear statement that would be necessary
to alter the constitutional standard for evaluating sex-based
classifications. 6
3 In order for a sex-based classification to pass constitutional muster it must
survive an intermediate level scrutiny: the classification must serve "'important governmental
objectives and... the discriminatory means employed' [must be] 'substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives'." 116 S. Ct. at 2275. See also Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976).
3 116 S.Ct. at 2274.
Id. See also J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994); Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 n.* (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Heckler v. Mathews,
465 U.S. 728, 744 (1984); Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724, 731; Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S.
445,461 (1981); Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,273 (1979).
"SeeSanAntonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,49 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) ("A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a
spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection
Clause . . . that is, an approach in which 'concentration [is] placed upon the character of the
classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against
of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support
of the classification.") (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-521 (1970)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).
36See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 183 n.22 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
__ U.S. _, 117 S.Ct. 1469 (1997) ("[United States v. Virginia] adds nothing to the
analysis of equal protection challenges to gender based classifications that have not been part
of that analysis since 1979."). But see Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 456 n.6 (7th Cir.
1996) ("We express no opinion on whether the Court's ruling heightens the level of scrutiny
applied to gender discrimination in this circuit."); Engineering Contractors Ass'n v. Metropolitan
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Moreover, the Supreme Court applied the same constitutional test
to the other single-sex school which was challenged before it -- Mississippi
University for Women. That school also failed both prongs of the test.
3 7
In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan38 the justification offered
for the existence of the all-female nursing college was that it "compensates
for discrimination against women., 39  While the Supreme Court
acknowledged that affirmative action aimed to redress sex discrimination
could serve an important state interest, 40 it rejected that proposed
justification in Hogan on the grounds that women were not currently
discriminated against in the field of nursing. 41 The Court rightly required
that affirmative action work to compensate for actual identifiable gender
bias4" -- however, it found that "women earned 94 percent of the nursing
baccalaureate degrees conferred in Mississippi and 98.6 percent of the
degrees earned nationwide." 43 In addition, the Court held that the state
had failed to prove that the intent of the founders of M.U.W. was to
compensate women for discrimination: "the impetus for founding MUW
Dade County, 943 F. Supp. 1546, 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1996) ("This court cannot say for certain
whether the Supreme Court intended that the VMI decision signal a heightening in scrutiny of
gender-based classifications."); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreward: Leaving Things Undecided, 110
HARV. L. REv. 4, 108 (1996) ("Virginia heightens the level of scrutiny [for sex] and brings it
closer to the 'strict scrutiny' that is applied to discrimination on the basis of race.").
" The Citadel also failed both prongs of Justice Ginsburg's test. See Faulkner v.
Jones, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 1995). But see Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C.
1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 951 (1971) (affirming lower court decision rejecting challenge to all-
female college under the rational relation test).
38 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
39 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 727.
4 Id. at 728 ("In limited circumstances, a gender-based classification favoring one
sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is
disproportionately burdened.")
" Id. at 729 ("Mississippi has made no showing that women lacked opportunities
to obtain training in the field of nursing or to attain positions of leadership in that field when
the MUW School of Nursing opened its doors or that women currently are deprived of such
opportunities.").
42 Id. at 728 ("members of the gender benefited by the classification [must] actually
suffer a disadvantage related to the classification.").
41 Id. at 729.
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came not from a desire to provide women with advantages superior to
those offered men, but rather from a desire to provide white women in
Mississippi access to state-supported higher learning."" Thus, neither the
current operation of the school nor the original intent of the school's
founders supported the state's argument that the all-female nursing school
compensated for discrimination against women. Moreover, the state failed
to show that its single-sex approach to teaching nursing was necessary to
satisfy its educational objectives.45 As for the second prong of the test,.the
Court held that the exclusion of men from M.U.W. "tends to perpetuate
the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job,"46 thereby
depressing the wages of the women in the field.47  This is
unconstitutional.48
44 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 727 n. 13; Id. at 730 n.16 ("Even were we to assume that
discrimination against women affects their opportunity to obtain an education or to obtain
leadership roles in nursing, the challenged policy nonetheless would be invalid, for the State
has failed to establish that the legislature intended the single-sex policy to compensate for
any perceived discrimination.").
" See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982) ("The
uncontroverted record reveals that admitting men to nursing classes does not affect teaching
style ... that the presence of men in the classroom would not affect the performance of the
female nursing students ... and that men in coeducational nursing schools do not dominate
the classroom.").
4
1 Id. at 729.
47
1 Id. at 729 n. 15.
48 Although I believe that it was correctly decided, Hogan is a somewhat more
difficult case than the Supreme Court made it out to be. I agree with the Court that M.U.W.'s
single-sex admissions policy was not justified by the intent of the school's founders, or by a need
to compensate for gender bias preventing women from entering the nursing profession.
However, I am less convinced that M.U.W. served no other constitutionally significant
compensatory purpose. For example, by providing the opportunity for more women to obtain
four year college degrees, the school may have worked to compensate women for gender bias
in Mississippi's public school system as a whole or for the exclusion of women from
opportunities for undergraduate education in the state.
However, even if the Court found that M.U.W. served a compensatory purpose,
it is still questionable whether there was a snug enough fit between the creation of a women's
nursing college and the goal of increasing women's college attendance rates, and it is certainly
arguable that the socio-historical meaning of such a school would perpetuate stereotypes about
appropriate occupations for women.
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The pedagogical justification offered by the state in United States
v. Virginia was that an all-male military academy "fosters 'diversity in
educational approaches."'49 However, given Virginia's long history of
excluding women from its institutions of higher education, the Court was
unpersuaded that the founders of VMI instituted an all-male admissions
policy at that school for the purpose of furthering diversity of educational
offerings within the state.5" The Supreme Court correctly rejected the
diversity justification on the grounds that the school only created greater
diversity for men -- who were already well served by the state of Virginia's
educational system." Moreover, the novelty or uniqueness of an
educational strategy alone cannot be a pedagogical justification. To be
pedagogically justified, in addition to simply being unique, a school must
provide an educational benefit to its students.5 As for the second prong
of the test, the Court held that the exclusion of women from VMI
perpetuated negative stereotypes about women's capacities -- that we do
not have the "right stuff' to survive the adversative method.53 This is
unconstitutional.
There are several reasons why the decisions in Hogan and United
States v. Virginia do not preclude the existence of The Leadership School.
First, those cases involved higher education, and the Supreme Court has
yet to decide a case involving single-sex education on the kindergarten
through twelfth grade level ("K-12"). Lower courts which have
49 116 S. Ct. at 2267.
'0 116 S. Ct. at 2277 ("Neither recent nor distant history bears out Virginia's
alleged pursuit of diversity through single-sex educational options.").
"' 116 S. Ct. at 2279 ("[T]his plan serves the State's sons, it makes no provision
whatever for her daughters. That is not equal protection.") (emphasis omitted). See Dianne
Avery, Institutional Myths, Historical Narratives and Social Science Evidence: Reading the
"Record" in the Virginia Military Institute Case, 5 S. CAL. R. L. & WOMEN'S STUDIES 189,
318-324 (1996) (describing VMI's defense as a catch-22).
52 See 116 S. Ct. at 2290 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("A State does not have
substantial interest in [any educational] methodology unless it is pedagogically beneficial.").
" 116 S. Ct. at 2280 ("The notion that admission of women would downgrade
VMI's stature, destroy the adversative system and, with it, even the school, is a judgment
hardly proved, a prediction hardly different from other 'self-fulfilling prophec[ies],' once
routinely used to deny rights or opportunities.").
19981 109
110 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIV
considered the issue have cited the formative nature of the pre-adolescent
years and the uniqueness of adolescence as reasons the law should be
more receptive to a variety of educational strategies and should scrutinize
sex-segregation in K- 12 education less harshly than in undergraduate and
graduate education. "
More importantly, many K-12 all-girls schools can satisfy both
prongs of the test established in United States v. Virginia. The Leadership
School, for example, could show that its all-girls educational methodology
is substantially related to the important government interest of
compensating girls for gender bias in the New York City public school
system.5 Unlike the would-be nurses in Hogan, girls in our public schools
4 See Vorchheimer v. Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880, 887 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd, 430
U.S. 703 (1977) ("Equal educational opportunities should be available to both sexes in any
intellectual field. However, the special emotional problems of the adolescent years are
matters of human experience and have led some educational experts to opt for one-sex high
schools."). See also Carol Gilligan, Teaching Shakespeare's Sister: Notes from the
Underground of Female Adolescence, in MAKING CONNECTIONS 10 (Carol Gilligan et al.
eds., 1989) (concluding from the results of the Dodge study that "[aldolescence seems a
watershed in female development, a time when girls are in danger of drowning or
disappearing").
In the context of cases involving racial segregation, the Supreme Court has also
acknowledged that "a state university system is quite different in very relevant respects from
primary and secondary schools." United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 728-29 (1992).
However, in that context the differences between K-12 and higher education -- that the
former is compulsory and that the permissible approaches to remedying racial segregation
in the latter are more limited -- militate in favor of a greater role for courts in promoting
integration on the K-12 grade level. Id. See also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,685-86
(1971) (noting "significant differences" between institutions of higher education and
elementary and secondary schools for purposes of assessing violations of the Establishment
Clause).
55 The Supreme Court has required that voluntary affirmative action programs for
racial minorities be justified by particularized findings that the class intended to benefit from
the program faces actual discrimination in the relevant endeavor. See City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989) ("While the States and their subdivisions may take
remedial action when they possess evidence that their own spending practices are exacerbating
a pattern of prior discrimination, they must identify that discrimination, public or private, with
some specificity before they may use race-conscious relief"); See also Adarand v. Pefia, 515
U.S. 200,228-29 (1995) (.'[Glood intentions' alone are not enough to sustain a supposedly
'benign' racial classification..."). To date, the Court has not required similar particularized
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have actually suffered a disadvantage -- gender bias56 -- which studies
have shown can be successfully redressed by all-girls education.57 The
factual findings in order to uphold voluntary sex-based affirmative action plans. Rather, a
showing that the classification does not work to, nor was it intended to subordinate women has
been sufficient to justify such affirmative action plans. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313,
317 (1977) ("[W]e have rejected attempts to justify gender classifications as compensation for
past discrimination against women when the classifications in fact penalized women wage
earners, or when the statutory structure and its legislative history revealed that the classification
was not enacted as compensation for past discrimination.") (citations omitted).
56 The effects of gender bias are not subtle: "[in mixed-sex schools, researchers
have found that: (1) female cognitive development may be depressed or impaired; (2) female
educational and occupational aspirations and their ultimate attainment may be lowered; (3)
female self-confidence and self-esteem may be damaged; (4) females may receive unequal
treatment in the classroom and in curriculum opportunities; (5) teachers may devalue the
work of female students relative to males." Cornelius Riordan, Single-Gender Schools:
Outcomes for African and Hispanic Americans, 10 RES SOc. OF EDUC. AND SOCIALIZATION
117, 180 (1994) [hereinafter Riordan, Outcomes]. However, the effect of gender bias on
adolescent girls "var[ies] among ethnic groups. Far more African American girls retain their
overall self-esteem during adolescence than White or Latina girls, maintaining a stronger
sense of both personal and familial importance.... The one exception for African American
girls is their feelings about school: black girls are more pessimistic about both their teachers
and their schoolwork than other girls." ORENSTEIN, supra note 11, at xvii, 159-61. See also
David Sadker, Where the Girls Are: Confusing Political Arguments with Educational
Research, 61 EDuC.WK. 49, Sept. 4, 1996, at 49; MYRA SADKER & DAVID SADKER, FAILING
AT FAIRNESS: How AMERICA'S SCHOOLS CHEAT GIRLS (1994) [hereinafter SADKER &
SADKER, FAIRNESS]; AAUW REPORT, supra note 11; Bernice Resnick Sandier, The Classroom
Climate: Still a Chilly One for Women, in EDUCATING MEN AND WOMEN TOGETHER:
COEDUCATION INACHANGING WORLD (Carol Lasser ed., 1987); Myra Sadker & David Sadker,
Sexism in the Classroom: From Grade School to Graduate School, 67 Pm DELTA KAPPAN 512
(1986). Sexual harassment, which denies a disproportionate number of female students equal
educational opportunity, is prevalent in our public school systems. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW SURVEY
ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1993).
The existence of gender bias in higher education, particularly in law schools, has
also been well documented. See generally Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen:
Women's Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1994); Judith
Resnik, Gender Bias: From Classes to Courts, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2195 (1993); Catherine
Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of 20 Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299 (1988).
" "A cursory examination of our findings indicates a broad base of positive effects
for single-sex schools across a diverse array of educational outcomes .... On the basis of
the empirical evidence assembled here, we conclude that a single-sex school organizational
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studies show this to be especially true for girls of color.5" Second, The
Leadership School could show that it neither was intended to nor does it
work to perpetuate the legal, social, or economic inferiority of women.
The school could offer evidence that its sex-based admissions policy is not
based on the notion that boys or girls are inherently better suited towards
traditionally sex specific subjects, nor does it "discourage the very
experimentation with social roles that would prove the traditional
assumptions to be wrong."59 Rather, it seeks to promote equal citizenship
by countering the societal pressures that discourage adolescent girls from
excelling in school (especially in what are traditionally thought of as
effect is the most plausible explanation for the observed results." ANTHONY BRYK ET AL.,
CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AND THE COMMON GOOD 239 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993). See also
CORNELIUS RIORDAN, GIRLS AND BoYs IN SCHOOL: TOGETHER OR SEPARATE? 49, 134
(Teachers College Press 1990) [hereinafter RIORDAN, SCHOOL] (single-sex schools provide
girls with more successful female role models, unconstrained access to the full range of the
academic curriculum, more teacher-student interaction, less sex-role-stereotype perpetuation
in peer interactions and an atmosphere which places less emphasis on physical attractiveness
and heterosexual popularity); SADKER & SADKER, FAIRNESS, supra note 56, at 233 ("Girls
in single-sex schools have higher self-esteem, are more interested in nontraditional subjects
such as science and math, and are less likely to stereotype jobs and careers."); Riordan,
Outcomes, supra note 56, at 180.
s See RIORDAN, SCHOOL, supra note 57, at 101-13 ("[T]he short term cognitive
effects of single-sex schooling differ according to race and sex. Minority females profit most
from single-sex schooling, followed by minority males, and then by white females ... ").
See also Riordan, Outcomes, supra note 56, at 181. In fact, single-sex education is increasingly
beneficial to students the more that they differ from the race and sex standards that are
privileged by the society in which they live. Id.
" Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d 459, 467 (2d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1095 (1986). See also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) ("[I]f the statutory objective is to exclude or 'protect' members of
one gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately
inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate . . . . the validity of a classification [must be]
determined through reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application of
traditional, often inaccurate assumptions about the proper roles of men and women"). See
generally Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: an Empirical
Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1073 (1992); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories about Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of
Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1749 (1990).
1998] PANEL H 113
"male" subjects, like math and science), and by preparing girls for higher
education and for well paying jobs.6" As the application for The
Leadership School puts it, "[riather than being ivory towers that try to
protect girls from the real world, [all-girls] schools try to strengthen their
students to prepare them for success in a coeducational world.",61 This is
constitutional.
III. ALL-GiRLS SCHOOLS AND FEDERAL STATUTES
Moreover, K-12 all-girls public schools are not prohibited by any
of the statutory tools that lawyers have used to fight for sex equality in
public schools. Although Title IX of the Educational Amendments of
1972 does prohibit sex-segregation in some; educational institutions, it
does not apply to K-1 2 schools.62 The first rule of statutory interpretation
is that, provided it is unambiguous, the plain language of a statute is
60 See generally Luke Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of
Preferential Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action
Debate, II HARv. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 4 (1994) (arguing that affirmative action is "an
attempt to offer .. greater equality of opportunity in a social context marked by pervasive
inequalities, one in which many institutional practices work to impede a fair assessment of
[ones] capabilities .... "); Chai Feldblum et al., Legal Challenges to All-Female Organizations,
21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 171,174-81 (1986).
6 Application for The Leadership School (1996) (quoting MEG MOULTON, WHY
SEND YOUR DAUGHTER To A GIRL'S SCHOOL?). See also EMMA WILLARD SCHOOL, How
BEST TO PREPARE GIRLS TO EXCEL IN THE REAL WORLD 16 (1996) ("There is a critical
connection between self-confidence and success .... The single-gender school, with its
dedication to the intellectual and emotional development of girls, has a special power to help
girls shed the chrysalis of adolescence and emerge as self-confident young women, ready to
excel in college and the real world.").
6' 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. The Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974
("EEOA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq., which was enacted to eliminate racially segregated
public schools, also prohibits sex discrimination in education. See United States v. Hinds
County Sch. Bd., 560 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1977). However, as the legislative history of that
statute does not include any mention of Congress's intent with respect to single-sex schools,
for the past twenty years federal courts have declined to interpret the EEOA to prohibit
single-sex education. See Garrett v. Board of Educ. of Detroit, 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1010
(E.D. Mich. 1991); Vorchheimer v. Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880, 883-85 (3d Cir. 1976), affld,
430 U.S. 703 (1977).
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controlling (we assume that Congress meant what it said).63 The plain
language of Title IX unambiguously states that the prohibition against
single-sex education "shall apply only to institutions of vocational
education, professional education, and graduate higher education, and to
public institutions of undergraduate higher education. 6 4 It says nothing
about K-12 education. In addition, the legislative history of Title IX is
consistent with the plain language of the statute. Congress chose not to
enact the House bill which would have required that all single-sex schools,
both public and private, become coeducational, and instead enacted the
Senate proposal, which did not contain that provision.6" Moreover, while
the implementing regulations for Title IX provide that "[n]o person shall,
on the basis of sex, be denied admission, or be subjected to discrimination
in admission,"66 those regulations also do not apply to K-12 education.6"
'See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjomo, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990)
("The starting point for interpretation of a statute 'is the language of the statute itself.
Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily
be regarded as conclusive'.") (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc. 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980))
6 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)(1). See also Vorchheimer v. School Dist. Phila., 532
F.2d 880, 883 (3d Cir. 1976), affd, 430 U.S. 703 (1977) ("[Title IX] applies, however, to
only specified types of educational institutions and excludes from its coverage the admission
policies of secondary schools.").
65 See Testimony of Senator Birch Bayh, S. Con. Rec. 5802-08 (Feb. 28, 1972).
But see Garrett v. Board of Educ. of Detroit, 775 F.Supp. 1004, 1008 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
("The Court views this exemption for admissions as applicable primarily to historically
pre-existing single sex schools; it is not viewed as authorization to establish new single-sex
schools. No case has ever upheld the existence of a sex-segregated public school that has
the effect of favoring one sex over another. The interplay of the Constitution and other
statutes, as well as the legislative history, diminishes the persuasiveness of this argument.").
" 34 C.F.R. § 106.21. Presumably, plaintiffs could state a claim for declaratory
and injunctive relief under the implementing regulations of Title IX, in the same manner that
the Supreme Court has recognized claims under the implementing regulations of Title VI.
See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
67 Subpart C of the regulations, which covers discrimination on the basis of sex in
admissions and recruitment, only applies to "institutions of vocational education, professional
education, graduate higher education, and public institutions of undergraduate higher education,"
not to K-12 education. 34 C.F.R. § 106.15(c)-(e). In addition, subpart D of the regulations,
which applies to discrimination on the basis of sex in education programs and activities, "does
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In fact the regulations allow a school district to take affirmative action to
overcome the effects of gender bias.68 Thus, neither Title IX, nor the
implementing regulations promulgated by the Department of Education
under that statute prohibit the creation of single-sex programs to remedy
gender bias.
Mind you, the fact that all-girls schools are legally permissible
does not mean that every single one will survive constitutional and
statutory scrutiny, nor does it mean that they are our path to salvation. In
fact, I am quite certain that all-girls schools will not solve many of the
problems in the New York City public school system -- such as the lack
of professional development for teachers, the travesty that is special
education, etc. In addition, it is unlikely that all-girls schools will alleviate
the gender bias in coeducational schools. However, it is also improbable
that the existence of a few all-girls public schools will have the negative
effects that some fear.
Opponents of The Leadership School argue that single-sex schools
will drain female students away from coeducational schools and tip the sex
balance in those schools towards the boys. However, there are more
female students in the public school system than there are male students,
and too few female students desire single-sex education to have a
significant effect on the sex composition of coeducational schools.69
Others argue that The Leadership School is insignificant because it only
serves fifty-five of the over 500,000 girls in the New York City public
school system.7" Perhaps because I attribute many of the qualities which
not apply ... to a recipient to which subpart C does not apply." 34 C.F.R.§ 106.31 (a).
Accordingly, neither § 106.3 1(b)(2) nor § 106.33 of subpart D - on which the court relied in
Garrett vBd. ofEduc. ofDetroit, 777 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991) for the proposition that
single-sex schools violate Title IX - apply to K- 12 education.
68 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b). See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155,170 (1st Cir.
1996), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 117 S.Ct. 1469 (1997) ("Like other anti-discrimination
statutory schemes, the Title IX regime pennits affirmative action.") (emphasis in original).
69 OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH, THE CLASS OF 1995 FOUR-YEAR
LONGITuDiNAL REPORT 10 (1995) [hereinafter LONGITUDINAL REPORT] (there were 1,439
more girls than boys in the Class of 1995).
70Saturday Today (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 7, 1996) ("[t]here are a million
students in the New York City public school system, and this is helping 50 or 60 of them.").
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I most value in myself to the excellent educational opportunities -- both
coeducational and single-sex -- which I have been afforded, I cannot
dismiss the experiences of the fifty-five girls who are currently enrolled in
The Leadership School as "inconsequential" or "irrelevant." The personal
benefit each individual derives from a strong educational experience is
significant, even if that experience does not work to transform society as
a whole. Still other opponents of the school worry that the existence of
The Leadership School will absolve educators of responsibility for
remedying gender bias in the rest of the public school system. That simply
has not been the case -- educators who were previously committed to
eliminating gender bias in coeducational schools have not been distracted
from their task by the opening of The Leadership School.' Nor should
they be, because we do not have to pick one strategy to fight for sex
equality in public education. We can, and we should, provide the option
of all-girls public schools at the same time as we seek to redress the
gender bias in coeducational schools -- no one is requiring us to find one
ultimate solution.
IV. ALL-GIRLS SCHOOLS AND BOYS
Before addressing the viability of an equal protection claim
brought by a boy challenging The Leadership School,72 I want to make a
comment about one particularly distressing element of many of the
7" See, e.g., BERNICE SANDLER & ROBERT SHOOP, SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON
CAMPUS (1997).
71 I initially assumed that the constitutionality of The Leadership School would be
challenged on the grounds that the school was harmful to the girls attending the school
because it perpetuated negative stereotypes of their abilities. To my surprise, the complaint
that has been filed against the school with the Department of Education seems not to be so
much concerned about the rights of girls in East Harlem as it is concerned about the rights
of boys in East Harlem -- but as the folks who have challenged the school have yet to find
a plaintiff to represent, it is not entirely clear whose interests they are advocating. See
Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 512 (1976) ("[S]ome civil rights lawyers ...
are making decisions, setting priorities, and undertaking responsibilities that should be
determined by their clients and shaped by the community.").
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conversations I have had about the school. The conversations tend to
sound like the most important question is whether you are "on the girls'
side" or "on the boys' side." I think it is absurd to approach this issue as
though it were about pitting the interests of the girls in our public school
system against the interests of the boys.73 The fact is that New York City
public schools fail to provide too many of our girls and our boys with an
adequate education. So, talking about how the dropout rate is higher for
boys (19%) than for girls (almost 17%) ignores a much more important
fact, which is that the overall dropout rate in New York City is way too
high -- it is more than double that of the rest of the state excluding the
City.74 And it ignores the fact that dropout rates are particularly egregious
for the communities served by District 4 -- Latino and African American
students have citywide dropout rates of 24% and 18%, respectively.75 On
the flip side, focusing on the fact that the poverty rate is significantly
higher for female dropouts than it is for male dropouts, 76 obscures the fact
that the percentage of children (boys and girls) living in poverty in District
4 -- 88% -- is unacceptably high.7 There has to be a more productive way
" See, e.g., Anita K. Blair, The New Move Equal Protection Clause, 44 FED.
LAWYER 35, 38 (1997) ("No one doubts that young women in Harlem suffer from
disadvantages, but are they not better off than their brothers?").
74 
LONGITUDINAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 10. For 1994-95, the one year dropout
rate for New York City was 6.7% compared to 2.5% for the rest of New York State excluding
the City and 4.1% for New York State as a whole. Telephone interview with Peter Cruz, New
York State Department of Education (Jan. 17, 1997).
7 LONGITUDINAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 13.
76 47% of Black women who drop out of high school compared to 29% of Black
men who dropout of high school live in poverty. The numbers for Latinos are 35% compared
to 24%, and for Whites are 23% compared to 15%. AAUW REPORT, supra note 11, at 82. In
1991, Black men earned $22,080 on average compared to $18,720 for Black women. Blacks
in America - 1992, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS STATISTICAL BRIEF 1
(May 1994).
17 Telephone interview with Marvin Jacobs, Student Information New York City
Board of Education (Jan. 17, 1997) (the New York City Board of Education considers
65.99% of all public school students to be "low income"). The Board of Education measures
the percentage of "low income" children in the public school system by determining how
many children qualify under the Healthy Meals for Children Act, the federal free lunch
program. 42 U.S.C. § 1751, et seq. Under the Health Meals for Children Act, free lunches
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to think about this.
Rather than pit one sex against the other we should remember that
the boys and the girls in District 4 are not autonomous self-contained
competing -camps -- they are brothers and sisters, cousins, friends, next
door neighbors -- they are part of the same community." Educational
strategies that empower either the girls or the boys in District 4, empower
the community. I do not mean to embrace some sort of trickle-down
theory, because I do not believe that it is sufficient (or constitutionally
permissible) to help just the girls or to help just the boys. Nor do I see sex
equity as in any way secondary to or divisible from the empowerment of
communities of color. But, I would rather spend my time thinking about
educational strategies that work to empower communities of men and
women, than to spend it measuring the comparative pain of boys against
that of girls.79
The first step to finding community empowering educational
strategies is to accept that education is not a one-size-fits-all thing -- and
that different children benefit more or less from different educational
strategies. For example, educational experts and social psychologists have
shown that single-sex schools enhance the educational achievement of
most girls -- "[b]ecause of existing differences between the sexes in
power, opportunities, and resulting self-confidence, on the average young
are provided to children whose family income is no more than "130 percent of the applicable
family size income levels contained in the nonfarm income poverty guidelines prescribed by
the Office of Management and Budget" as adjusted for inflation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1758(b)(1)(A)
(1994). For the 1996-97 academic year in New York City, the qualifying income level was
S20,280 for a family of four, and $13,460 for a family of two. REGULATION OF THE
CHANCELLOR, Student Meal Prices and Income Scale for Determination ofEligibility (Sept.
18, 1996).
7 As many Black feminists have contended, "[o]ur situation as Black people
necessitates that we have solidarity around the fact of race .... We struggle together with
Black men against racism, while we also struggle with Black men about sexism." The
Combahee River Collective Statement, in HOME GIRLs: A BLACK FEMINIST ANTHOLOGY 275
(Barbara Smith ed., 1983).
71 See Frances Beale, Double Jeopardy: To Be Black and Female, in THE BLACK
WOMAN: AN ANTHOLOGY 93 (Toni Cade ed., 1970) ("It is fallacious reasoning that in order
for the Black man to be strong, the Black woman has to be weak.").
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women do better in their intellectual development when they have at least
a few years to learn and study with one another than when they are in co-
ed environments."8 However, single-sex schools do not appear to be
similarly advantageous for most boys.81 I am not positing the existence of
80 CAROL TAVRIS, THE MISMEASURE OF WOMAN 126 (Simon & Schuster 1992).
See also RIORDAN, SCHOOL, supra note 57, at 61 ("Girls in single-sex schools ... seem to
obtain higher cognitive outcomes than their counterparts in mixed-sex schools."); BRYK ET
AL.,supra note 69, at 225-41.
8" There is evidence that all-male educational environments are harmful to White
boys. "[B]oys in single-sex schools score lower on the cognitive tests than boys in mixed-sex
schools. . . . The affective outcomes follow the same pattern. Boys in mixed-sex schools
have higher self-esteem, higher sense of environmental control, and more egalitarian
attitudes toward the role of women in society." RIORDAN, ScHOOL, supra note 57, at 110-11;
CORNELIUS RIORDAN, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLING: PROPONENTS SPEAK
48 (1993). But see SADKER & SADKER, FAIRNESS, supra note 56, at 240 ("the jury is still out
when it comes to all-male education."); BRYK ET AL., supra note 57, at 239 ("[Our] results
indicate that something positive is occurring in single-sex Catholic high schools. In general,
the results appear stronger for girls than boys.").
However, at least two studies have shown that single-sex schools can improve the
educational achievement of Black and Latino boys. See Riordan, Outcomes, supra note 56,
at 198 (Black and Latino boys in all-boys Catholic high schools had better test scores, were
more likely to take academic courses and felt greater control over their environments than
demographically matched boys in coeducational Catholic schools); see also RiORDAN,
SCHOOL, supra note 57. The difference in the effectiveness of single-sex education for
White boys and boys of color is unsurprising given that single-sex education is increasingly
beneficial to students the more that they differ from the race and sex standards that are
privileged by the society in which they live. See Riordan, Outcomes, supra note 56, at 180.
District 4 is considering opening an all-boys public school. See Somini Sengupt,
East Harlem District is Considering an All-Boys Public School, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1996,
at B9. In 1991, a district court in Michigan ordered an all-boys high school, which was
established as an educational response to the large number of "at risk" students attending
Detroit area schools, to admit female students. The court held that the school was not
pedagogically justified because the school board "proffered no evidence that the presence
of girls in the classroom bears a substantial relationship to the difficulties facing urban
males." Garrett v. Board of Educ. of Detroit, 777 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
See also Charles Vergon, Male Academies for At-Risk Urban Youth: Legal and Policy
Lessons from The Detroit Experience, 79 ED. LAW REP. 351 (1993). The coeducational
school has reported success in improving the academic performance of both male and female
students who are "at risk." See Patrice M. Jones, A Place All Their Own Detroit Uses
SpecialAcademies to Help Black Boys Overcome Challenges Series: Hard Lessons -- Black
Males Struggle to Beat the Odds, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 23, 1996, at Al.
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inherent, biologically determined sex-based differences in the learning
styles of adolescents. I agree with Judith Butler that "[tihere is no gender
identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively
constructed by the very 'experiences' that are said to be its results."82
Rather, I am saying that differences in the socialization of boys and girls,
and in the power of men and women in our society, affect children's lives
and schooling experiences. 3 Thus, in order to provide equally beneficial
learning experiences for all children, we need to have an array of schools
with different emphases and pedagogical approaches to serve their
different educational interests and needs.
That is, in fact, what District 4 has done. Junior high school
students in that school district choose from among twenty option schools
(all of which are public schools).84 Among their choices are an
82 JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 25 (1990). See also Joan E. Bertin,
Opposing All-Male Admission Policy at Virginia Military Institute Amicus Curiae Brief of
Professor Carol Gilligan and the Program on Gender, Science, and Law, 16 WOMEN'S RTs.
L. REP. 1, 14 (1994) ("The observations about psychological development patterns that are
generally associated with gender in In a Different Voice are not based on any premise of
inherent differences between the sexes, but solely on the different nature of their experiences.").
The relevant question for legal academics, however, is not whether differences between male
and female gender identities are the inevitable product of the physical differences between the
sexes, but how the law contributes to the construction of the statistical differences between the
physical attributes, aptitudes and interests of men and women as significant. See Tracy E.
Higgins, "By Reason of Their Sex: " Feminist Theory, Postmodernism, and Justice, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1536, 1582 (1995) ("biological differences do not preexist the interpretive
frame of legal discourse"); CAROL TAVRIS AND CAROLE WADE, THE LONGEST WAR: SEX
DIFFERENCES IN PERSPECTIVE (1984) (discussing sex differences). But see Robin West,
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1988) (arguing that the inherent difference
between men and women is that "women are 'essentially connected,' not 'essentially separate,'
from the rest of human life, both materially, through pregnancy, intercourse, and breast-feeding,
and existentially, through the moral and practical life.").
' "[T]he gender context of schooling is a consequential factor affecting what males
and females respectively derive from their schooling." Riordan, Outcomes, supra note 56,
at 180.
84 Conservatives have been the most vocal proponents of school choice -- usually
defined as providing vouchers or tuition tax credits to parents whose children attend private
or parochial schools. See JOHN E. CHUBB AND TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990). However, the success of public school choice plans, like the
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environmental science school, two bilingual/multicultural education
schools, a performing arts school, two schools which offer intensive
science and math instruction and a maritime school.85 These schools, like
The Leadership School, are part of a citywide educational reform effort
aimed at creating smaller schools to cater to particular student interests
and needs. This is a productive approach to the problem.
But, to return to the question of the boy's legal challenge -- The
Leadership School does not have a sex exclusive admissions policy,86 and
no boy has yet applied to the school -- but, if sometime in the future the
ACLU were to find a disgruntled 12 year old boy who believed that his
application to The Leadership School had been rejected on the basis of his
sex-- what then? Having established that The Leadership School is
constitutionally permissible (as it is pedagogically justified and it passes an
anti-subordination analysis), the boy would have suffered no violation of
his constitutional rights and therefore would not be entitled to a judicial
remedy. However, if none of the other small high-quality co-educational
middle schools in the school district catered to his particular interests and
needs, he and his parents should work to convince other parents and
teachers in the school district to set up a school that does. That is the
process by which most change does and should come about in our public
intradistrict transfer plan offered in District 4, offers a strong argument that private school
choice plans are unnecessary. Assuming that competition between schools can have
beneficial effects on the quality of those schools, competition from public schools with
different pedagogical methodologies should have the same positive effect on the public
school system as would competition with private schools.
85 COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT 4, OPTION SCHOOLS HANDBOOK 1995-1996.
8 That the admissions policy of the Leadership School does not explicitly exclude
boys is unlikely to effect the constitutionality of the school. In the context of racially segregated
schools, the Supreme Court has held that the legally relevant distinction between impermissible
dejure segregation and permissible de facto segregation is that the former is "brought about or
maintained by intentionalstate action." Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973)
(emphasis added). Although most of the informational material distributed by The Leadership
School uses sex neutral terms ("The Young Women's Leadership School will capitalize on the
intellectual curiosity and creative spirit which are inherent in everyone."), the school district's
intent to create a school exclusively for female students is apparent in the name of the school.
The school's name works to advertise it to female students and to dissuade male students from
applying.
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school system.87
V. ALL-GIRLS SCHOOLS, STRICT SCRUTINY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Earlier in this essay I drew a parallel between assumptions about
the inherent inferiority and stigmatizing nature of single-race and single-
sex institutions.88 My point in doing so was to illustrate that neither type
of institution is inherently inferior or stigmatizing, it is context that makes
them so. However, the law has treated single-race and single-sex
institutions quite differently, while race classifications have been strictly
scrutinized under the Equal Protection Clause, sex classifications have
been subject to a lower level of intermediate scrutiny.89 As a result, the
use of a race-based classification scheme is more likely to be struck down
as unconstitutional than is the use of a sex-based scheme.
I agree with Professor Ruth Colker that:
intermediate scrutiny has a beneficial
flexibility that is often lacking from strict
scrutiny and that strict scrutiny has a
seriousness that is often lacking from
intermediate scrutiny. [In addition,] the
flexibility of intermediate scrutiny
sometimes causes courts to overlook
serious claims of discrimination and the
inflexibility of strict scrutiny often leaves
them ill equipped to respond
See AMY GuTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 11 (Princeton Univ. Press 1987)
("The policies that result from our democratic deliberations will not always be the right ones,
but they will be more enlightened - by the values and concerns of the many communities
that constitute a democracy -- than those that would be made by unaccountable educational
experts.").
s Supra note 6 and accompanying text.
89 Craig v Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[t]o withstand constitutional
challenge,... classifications by gender must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.").
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appropriately to arguments for
affirmative action."°
I also recognize that there is no written law that can prevent misguided or
bigoted judges from upholding discriminatory race or sex-based
classifications.91 However, I want to put aside the question of whether
race classifications should be more strictly scrutinized than are sex-based
classifications, and talk about strategy. Some people feel that, they must
argue that The Leadership School is unconstitutional because they are
committed to having sex classifications evaluated by the same level of
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause as are race classifications.92
While I do not oppose the use of strict scrutiny for sex-based
classifications in theory, in practice, I worry that it would be winning the
battle just to lose the war.
For example, let's look at what strict scrutiny has done for people
of color lately... As the Supreme Court has interpreted strict scrutiny to
require a colorblind analysis93 in its recent race cases -- Adarand v. Peha,94
Shaw v. Reno95 and City of Richmond v. Croson96 -- the use of strict
" Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection,
61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1004-05 (1986).
9' See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Some take it as an affront to the seriousness and pervasiveness of sex discrimination
that sex -based classifications are evaluated by a lower level of scrutiny than are race
classifications. See Deborah L. Brake, Sex as a Suspect Class: An Argument for Applying
Strict Scrutiny to Gender Discrimination, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 953, 961 (1996)
("[W]hite men now have greater protection from reverse discrimination by affirmative action
programs than women have from government-sponsored discrimination against women."). See
also Sara Mandelbaum, A Judicial Blow for "Jane Crowism" at the Citadel in Faulkner v.
Jones, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 3, 15 (1994) ("The Women's Rights Project of the American Civil
Liberties Union ... will continue to argue that gender-based classifications should be subject to
strict scrutiny.").
" Of course, there is no essential link between the use of strict scrutiny and the
employment of color-blind analyses or remedies. In fact, the Supreme Court has employed
anti-subordination analysis to uphold race conscious remedies under strict scrutiny. See,
e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
94515 U.S. 200 (1995).
"' 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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scrutiny has resulted in a continuation of the political and economic
subordination of African Americans in this country. Moreover, in the
name of strict scrutiny, lower federal courts,97 and various states, like
California with its "civil rights" initiatives,98 have rejected the use of any
racial classifications irrespective of context -- whether the classifications
work to denigrate or to compensate people of color, whether they pass an
anti-subordination analysis or not, whether they promote equal citizenship
or not. Are we sure that we want strict scrutiny for sex classifications?
Let me spell out some of the possible implications of strictly
scrutinizing sex classifications and employing a sex-neutral analysis. First,
the ground under cases dealing with pregnancy and reproductive rights --
areas in which women are clearly not similarly situated to men -- could
become shaky.99 Second, the jurisprudence under which women have
benefited from sex-based affirmative action would collapse. 100 And third,
96 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
97 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996); Taxman v. Board of Educ.
of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996); Messer v. Meno, 936 F. Supp. 1280 (W.D.
Texas 1996); Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Columbus, 936 F. Supp. 1363
(S.D. Ohio 1996); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994); Maryland Troopers
Ass'n v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1993).
9' Proposition 209, which has been constitutionalized as Cal. Const. Art. 1, §31,
provides that California "shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any
individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation
of public employment, public education, or public contracting."
99 As has happened in the past, courts could fail to acknowledge discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy as a form of sex discrimination. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484 (1974); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (discussing Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964); U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991). But see
California Fed. Say. and Loan v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
"®Courts have evaluated and upheld sex-based affirmative action under intermediate
scrutiny. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977) (upholding Social Security
provision beneficial to female wage earners under intermediate scrutiny); Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal. v. City of S.F., 813 F.2d 922, 940 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding women's
business enterprise preference under intermediate scrutiny); Coral Constr. Co. v. King County,
941 F.2d 910, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992). Courts have also
upheld sex-based affirmative action under federal statutes and using lower levels of Equal
Protection scrutiny. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (defendant
did not violate Title VII by promoting female employee over male employee with higher test
score in order to eliminate a sex imbalance in its workforce); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
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by embracing and validating sex-neutrality we would add fuel to the fire
raging against affirmative action programs for men and women of color.
In fact, I believe that those who would interpret the constitution to prohibit
all-girls schools in the name of sex neutrality are guilty of the same type of
faulty logic in which the Supreme Court has engaged in its recent race
cases -- preferring the symmetry of sex-neutrality or color-blindness to the
democratic imperative of equal citizenship. I understand that symmetry
is attractive -- it is orderly, it is easy. But symmetry is not the only form
of order in the universe, and more importantly, it is not inherently just. It
is justice that we are after, isn't it?
VI. CONCLUSION
Those of us who are excited about the potential of public schools
to promote not just sex equality, but equal citizenship broadly defined,
should welcome the use of diverse educational strategies that offer New
York City public school students the attention that they deserve, that work
to strengthen the communities in which we all live, and that seek to redress
the sex and race biases which continue to plague our public schools. The
Leadership School is just such an educational strategy -- and the decision
to provide the school as an option to the parents and students of East
Harlem should be commended.
498 (1975) (upholding rule allowing women more years of service in the Navy before "up or
out" promotion decision under rational relation test); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)
(upholding property tax exemption for widows but not for widowers under rational relation test).
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